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Strings are ubiquitous in code. Not all strings are created equal, some contain structure that makes them
incompatible with other strings. CSS units are an obvious example. Worse, type checkers cannot see this
structure: this is the latent structure problem. We introduce SafeStrings to solve this problem and expose
latent structure in strings. Once visible, operations can leverage this structure to efficiently manipulate it;
further, SafeStrings permit the establishment of closure properties. SafeStrings harness the subtyping and
inheritance mechanics of their host language to create a natural hierarchy of string subtypes. SafeStrings
define an elegant programming model over strings: the front end use of a SafeString is clear and uncluered,
with complexity confined inside the definition of a particular SafeString. ey are lightweight, language-
agnostic and deployable, as we demonstrate by implementing SafeStrings in TypeScript. SafeStrings reduce the
surface area for cross-site scripting, argument selection defects, and they can facilitate fuzzing and analysis.
1 Introduction
Strings are the great dumping ground of programming. eir meagre structural obligations mean
that it is easy to pour information into them. Developers use them to store semi-structured, even
structured, data. omas Edison (paraphrasing Reynolds) captured the reason: “ ere is no expe-
dient to which a man will not resort to avoid the real labor of thinking.” Take colour assignment in
css. As flat strings they take the form '#XXX' or '#XXXXXX', but they implicitly encode three integer
values for rgb. Colour operations are naturally arithmetic, but as strings they are cumbersome
and error prone for developers to use. Simple operations are difficult: logically correct equality
'#000'== '#000000' is false. Incorrect assignments are common: x = '#F65T00' can only be caught
by the developer. We call this problem the latent structure problem. is is a widespread problem.
Finding errors of this sort is extremely difficult, and programmers care about these errors.
e TypeScript community has seen a great deal of discussion about string literals (Rosenwasser
2015) and regex-validated strings (TypeScript 2016). Regex here refers to PCRE2 style expressions,
which augment regular expression with backtracking, grouping, and lookahead. A quick internet
search for “validated strings” returns over ten million hits discussing solutions to the problem1.
e latent structure problem bedevils debugging; it also introduces security vulnerabilities: format
string aacks and SQL injection aacks are well known examples (Gollmann 2011). Handling
strings properly does not just give greater type safety, it gives greater safety.
Current type checkers cannot tackle the latent structure problem because they cannot reach
past string to the underlying structure; many problems in string theory are undecidable, making
many analyses either dependent on heuristics or very expensive. Strings seem an easy method
for representing structured information: instead, they are a great way to de-structure information.
Latent structure encoded in strings is stringly typed. e consequence is that programs pass around
and manipulate richly-structured strings as if they had lile or no structure.
1Google 29 March 2019.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
Industry has beenworking to solve the latent structure problem. To date, the dominant approach
is string validation by adding language support for checking that a string is what it claims to be.
is is the tack taken in a recent pull request for regex-validated strings in TypeScript (TypeScript
2016). is request has been open since 22 January 2016 and has had over 50 detailed comments.
It uses regular expressions to check that a string has the desired “shape”. A raw string is checked
for certain properties and this information is used to instantiate a string subtype. is catches the
css colour error: /ˆ#([0-9a-f]{3}|[0-9a-f]{6})/ does not accept '#F65T00'. e PCRE2 is lied to the
level of types, becoming part of the type declaration (Listing 1). is is clearly powerful, but it
has not been added to the language, despite the enthusiasm for the idea evident in the request and
despite the working code.
It is programming folklore that regular expressions add extra problems without resolving the
old ones. In type declarations, this is even more true: a css colour has a reasonably simple structure,
but a regular expression for an email address is not for the faint-hearted:
type Email = /ˆ[-a-z0 -9˜!$%ˆ&* _=+}{\?]+(\.[ -a-z0 -9˜!$%ˆ&*_=+}{\?]+) *@([a-z0 -9_
֒→ ][-a-z0 -9_]*(\.[-a-z0 -9_]+[a-z][a-z])
֒→ |([0 -9]{1,3}\.[0 -9]{1,3}\.[0 -9]{1,3}\.[0 -9]{1 ,3}))(:[0 -9]{1 ,5}) ?$/i];
Listing 1. Email PCRE2 type as suggested in (TypeScript 2016).
Clearly, regular expression validated strings are difficult to write and difficult to maintain. ey do
not admit of any easy notion of subtyping, even though it is reasonable to say that a gmail address
should be a subtype of email. Regex-validated strings are essentially immutable and the question of
what type results when applying operations to them is not even addressed. Any change in a string
necessitates rechecking the entire string, changing the red element of a css colour for instance.
is is expensive and wasteful.
We introduce SafeStrings to solve the latent structure problem. Like the PCRE2 validation ap-
proaches, SafeStrings expose the latent structure of a string to the type checker. is is where the
similarity ends. While regex-validated strings check, find structure, and then throw the memory
of that structure away, SafeStrings retain and manipulate the structure, taking what is latent and
making it manifest. SafeStrings allow operations closed over the type: an operation can be guar-
anteed to return the same type of SafeString (Section 3). As they store an image of the string’s
structure, SafeStrings do not need to recheck the entire string when performing updates, unlike
with regex-validated strings.
SafeStrings make the latent structure of the string available to the type checker (Section 2).
SafeStrings represent css colour string (Section 5) internally as (Hash (Red N) (Green N) (Blue N)
֒→ ). A special operation cast() allows us to reconstruct the original string: cast(): string = '#'
֒→ + red.toHex()+ green.toHex()+ blue.toHex();. Composable recognisers mediate habitation of the
structure, e.g. each structural element has its own independent parser and the string is tested by
puing them together in the correct order: cssColour = parseHash.then(parseRed.then(parseGreen.then
֒→ (parseBlue)));. We reject '#F65T00' as malformed, but we can also correctly allow the equality
x : CssColour = '#000'; y : CssColour = '#000000'; x == y = true; as the structure of both strings is
the same (Section 3.2). Of course, raw string equality is still possible. SafeStrings model subtyping
elegantly (Section 3.1). e internal representation of the string as a structure means subtyping
comes naturally from overriding structural elements. In the case of email addresses, a generic
recogniser for the domain part of the address is replaced with one especially tailored for ‘gmail’.
ere is no need to recheck the entire string (Section 3.3).
Capturing information in a type is familiar in functional programming, where it is common to
define a monad or applicative functor over a structure, then define functions over it. is paern
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is ultimately derived from categorical thinking: the recognition that certain types of structure
(functors) and functions (evaluation) define algebras. SafeStrings realise that the latent structure
problem can be solved in strings by modelling them as functor algebras (section 2).
To evaluate SafeStringswe consider three case studies of useful string types: filepaths (Section 5.2)
css strings (Section 5.3) and email strings (Section 5.1), in TypeScript. SafeStrings are a lightweight
annotation system that exploits the structure available in string literals. SafeStrings support an
elegant and natural programming model over strings by pushing the complexity away from the
programmer. is is in contrast to regex-validated strings, where the complexity sits directly in the
type signature, for limited gains. We demonstrate a possible concrete syntax for TypeScript which
we implement via a simple preprocessing stage (Section 4.3). e preprocess stage adds only a
sprinkle of syntactic sugar: SafeStrings are immediately deployable. SafeStrings do not require
any special language mechanisms beyond the ability to represent structured data and to define
recognisers over this data.
Exposing latent structure necessarily exposes complexity. Deciding who deals with that com-
plexity and when is vital for the usability of any programming model. SafeStrings provide a simple
and spare user-facing programming model; they move the intrinsic complexity away from front-
end developers to library authors.
Our principle contributions are:
• We identify the latent structure problem, the gap between a language’s representation of
data and the fine-grained way programs actually use and structure that data;
• To solve the latent structure problem, we introduce SafeStrings, a lightweight, language-
agnostic, and immediately deployable programming model (Section 2);
• We show how SafeString faciliate the definition and verification of type safe operations
over strings (Section 3.5); and
• We present a realisation of SafeStrings for TypeScript (Section 4).
e latent structure problem is not limited to strings. Lists, for example, are also likely to have
additional latent structure. e prevalence of strings in programming means that the problem is
oen most acutely felt in that domain. SafeStrings are integratable with the notion of value liter-
als, creating SafeLiterals, a uniform and easily extensible mechanism for introducing typed value
literals. is extension provides a simple solution to the proliferation of ad-hoc object parsers and
under-constrained JSON encodings to represent literal values in TypeScript and other program-
ming languages. All artefacts are available at anonymised.repo.to.do.
2 SafeStrings
SafeStrings address the latent structure problem for strings. Strings used in programming, such
as phone numbers, filepaths and zipcodes, tend to be highly structured. SafeStrings harness this
latent structure and surface it as required. is surfacing brings greater type safety, greater control
over mutability, and powerful subtyping capabilities.
In what follows, we use the term regular expression for expressions over the regular operators
that capture only the regular languages. We use PCRE2 to mean string matching expressions now
in widespread use in industrial programming languages. ese have regular expression-like syn-
tax, but are strictly more expressive, due to the presence of backtracking, grouping, and lookahead.
e pull request for regex-validated strings (TypeScript 2016) uses JavaScript-style expressions.
ese are PCRE2. We use string to refer to the string type of a language and string or raw string
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to mean a string in the sense of a list or array of characters, without reference to its exact repre-
sentation (e.g. object or null-terminated list) in a given language. We assume that raw strings are
finite to simplify the presentation2 .
Informally, SafeStrings combine a string, a grammar and a recogniser. A SafeString is the set of
all strings s such that they are in the language of the given grammar, i.e. SafeString = {s | s ∈ L(G)},
where L(G) is the language of the grammar. One can readily see that a SafeString expresses a subset
of strings. e recogniser is a parser (Section 4). In essence, a SafeString is a DSL (Domain Specific
Language) embedded in the native string type of a language and specialising it in a principled
fashion. A SafeString recogniser mediates this embedding: only raw strings accepted by the parser
are encoded into SafeStrings.
Operations take place inside the DSL rather than in the less structured world of strings. e
original, raw string can be recovered through a casting mechanism that has rules for recreating
the original string from the structure.
is is a lot of additional work to make strings safe. It is necessary because it is difficult to
extract structure from strings due to their form. ey are just the free monoid over an alphabet, σ ,
with concatenation as the binary operation, ·, and the empty string, ϵ , as the unit. is provides the
type checkerwith relatively lile information. Any combination of charactersmakes a valid string.
No other common data types are similarly unconstrained. Finding and encoding more structure
enables the type checker to make stronger static guarantees about the dynamic behaviour of a
program.
An email address safe@mail.com viewed solely as a string is uninteresting, but represented as a
SafeString provides a much greater amount of information available for analysis. An email string,
for example, could be represented by a structure such as
(At '@' (Name string1) (InvariantDot '.' (Left string2) (Right string3)))
e structure is an abstract syntax tree (AST). Each substring needs to be checked. It is not
sufficient for a string to merely have the scaffold (i.e. ‘@’ and ‘.’) of an email address to qualify as
an email string. Each element of the structure has to have an associated recogniser.
Using a single PCRE2, the recogniser for an email address is, as we have seen (Section 1) formida-
ble. Given the power to compose and order recognisers however, it is a much simpler proposition:
InvariantAt = /@/
Name = /[0-9a-zA-Z]+/
InvariantDot = /\./
Left = /[0-9-a-zA -Z-]+/
Right = /[0-9-a-zA -Z-.]+/
is presentation risks losing the string itself, and a SafeString should behave like a string when
required: we therefore also require a cast() : email -> string function that ‘reconstructs’ a string
from the representation. Its exact definition depends on the details of the representation.
Definition 2.1. A SafeString is a 4-tuple 〈G,R,ϕ, c〉 where
G :Grammar (1)
R :G → string → AST⊥ (2)
ϕ : AST → ASTPL (3)
α : ASTPL → string (4)
2A stream might be modelled as a SafeString if finite prefixes of the stream had an encodable structure. We leave this for
future work.
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class EqualAandB = {
count : num
cast () = 'a'.repeat(count) + 'b'.repeat(count);
}
Listing 2. A SafeString of balanced leers.
G is the grammar. R is a recogniser, a (partial) function that takes a grammar and an input string,
and returns AST ⊥, lied to include ⊥, capturing the possibility of failure. ϕ takes the AST and
maps it to ASTPL, a concrete realisation of the AST in the language PL. PL may be a programming
language (i.e. target) or a family of languages (e.g. LLVM IR). α is the cast() operation, taking AST
PL back to a raw string.
e fundamental insight for SafeStrings comes with ϕ: previous work on validated string types
performs the check R but does not convert and store the AST. e hard work of verification is
discarded rather than kept and utilised. e handling of the error condition, ⊥, in R is implemen-
tation specific; one can just fail, or return information about the error (i.e. a parse error). AST PL
might take the form of an object or an abstract data type. We are assuming, of course, that a string
has some structure. A string with no discernible grammar (i.e. a randomly generated string) is not
a good candidate to be a SafeString. At its simplest, the grammar conforms to a regular language,
but is not limited to such: SafeStrings easily embed context-free grammars and beyond. e CFGs
(context-free grammars) of likely use cases for SafeStrings are, in general, uncomplicated.
At its most general, the structure of a SafeString is an F-algebra (A,α). Let F be an endofunctor
on a category C , F : C → C , then A is the carrier set and α a morphism of the form F (A) → A.
F corresponds to the Grammar , whereas A is the set of strings. e ‘interpretation’ morphism
F (A) → A can now seen to be cast() of Section 1, specialised in that case to strings. In general,
the habitation of a SafeString is conditioned solely on its syntactic well-formedness. Whether the
resulting SafeString is meaningful depends on the sophistication of the recogniser: a syntactically
correct email may identify no recipient.
An invariant in a SafeString is a sub-string of the raw string that always occupies the same
position w.r.t the other elements of the string. Both the “@” symbol and the first dot “.” of an email
address are invariants. ey dictate the scaffold of the string around which the other elements
(substrings) are disposed. Consider an ‘inner-r’ string. A suitable representing structure would be:
(InnerR (InvariantR 'r') (Left str1) (Right str2))
'r' is an invariant element in an inner-r string and need not be specifically encoded in the rep-
resentation, i.e. the representation could be (InnerR (Left str1) (Right str2)). e 'r' is trivially
recoverable by defining the cast() method as cast = str1.cast() + 'r' + str2.cast().
e space requirements of SafeStrings depends on the size of AST pl . In general, a SafeString
requiresmore space than a raw string. Awell designed encoding, however, canmake the SafeString
representation more space efficient than that of the raw string. Consider the archetypal context-
free language of equal numbers of as and bs, anbn . Such a string can be arbitrarily long, but the
SafeString need only record the structure and the recogniser as a PCRE2 (Listing 2). A SafeString is
not limited solely to PCRE2 for membership tests. We can write recognisers that also count string
length or perform other operations that are not explicitly linked with membership. e SafeString
EqualAandB also counts the number of inputs.
Methods for string safety, such as type aliasing or regex-validated strings (Section 6), are special,
degenerate cases of SafeStrings. We call these special cases monolithic SafeStrings. Monolithic
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SafeStrings invoke R whenever they want to expose and access the internal structure. It does not
store the AST. ey only need the recogniser R, and do not define ϕ and α . In effect, a monolithic
SafeString matches the entire string and places that string inside a wrapper. is wrapper exposes
the string to the type checker without exposing the latent structure of the string:
class Monolithic {
// recogniser check on input
raw : 'no_recorded_structure '
}
A monolithic SafeString is the same as Fowler’s wrapper type (Section 6) and is isomorphic to
regex-validated string literals. is can easily be seen by noting that the only salient different
between regex validated types and monolithic SafeStrings is the method by which a new type is
created, i.e. either by privileged keyword or via a native record. As we shall see in Section 3,
monolithic SafeStrings, while easy to implement, lack much of the flexibility one gets from treat-
ing themwith amore complex representation. We briefly explore the implementation ofmonolithic
SafeStrings and SafeStrings over relatively simple structures as captured by PCRE2, showing how
they subsume earlier work (Section 6). More interesting SafeStrings involve grammars with mul-
tiple constructors and recognisers that match elements to constructors as well as accepting the
input string.
SafeStrings permit the efficient definition of function sensitive operators. Even a very simple
regular language need not be treated as a monolithic SafeString. e regular expression /.∗r .∗
recognises structure and therefore can be made modular. For ‘inner-r’ strings, SafeStrings has
isolated the Left and Right substrings without losing their relation to the main structural element.
We now examine the benefits SafeStrings provide by exposing the latent structure of a string.
3 Subtyping and Operations over SafeStrings
Type systems, at their most general, capture program invariants and use this information to pro-
vide feedback to a user. is feedback is most oen in the form of a type error which typically
results in a compilation failure or cessation of interpretation. Type systems are usually classified
by whether they are static or dynamic.
One of themain advantages of static type systems is they capture an abstraction of the program’s
dynamic invariants at compile time. is comes at the necessary cost of over-approximation. Clas-
sical type systems especially only capture a relatively coarse image of the program’s behaviour. For
example, most type systems capture the fact that a variable i is an integer3. ey cannot however
model the fact that an integer is even, natural number. Dependent types (Martin-Lo¨f 1985) are
sufficiently expressive to capture this kind of invariant at the type level. Dependent types come
with a large annotation and cognitive burden on the programmer (Section 6).
Liquid types are a decidable subset of dependent types so can strip away much of the associated
annotation complexity. is decidability means that constraints can be inferred statically without
proofs required from the user, in much the same manner that ‘normal’ types themselves can be
inferred in a Hindley-Milner type system. Liquid types are necessarily less expressive than full
dependent types, but the decidability makes them more useful for regular programming.
SafeStrings capture much of the expressive power of liquid types and apply it to strings. Given
that much of string theory is undecidable (Ganesh et al. 2011), it is inherently difficult to have a
decidable fragment of string theory suitable for instantiating liquid types. Many useful fragments
of string theory are decidable however (Chen et al. 2017) and progress has been made on solvers
3An obvious counterexample is TypeScript, which has a general number type.
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Fig. 1. Subtyping for a generic email SafeString string to specialised email string. As each node of the tree is
associated with a sub-recogniser (here a regular expression), it is necessary only to override the appropriate
recogniser. As the structure as not changed, it is not necessary to recheck the other nodes.
for string theory (Berzish et al. 2017). ese approaches to string safety are complementary to our
approach, and could be integrated into a language’s type checker.
e problem is compounded when we consider operations specialised over strings. As is well
known, the concatenation of two strings is a string, but the concatenation of two email strings
is very unlikely to be a well-formed email string. It is, however, still a string, so the operation is
closed under its supertype (Section 3.5). Exposing this information to a type checker allows us
to have liquid typing for specialised strings. Moreover, it provides the opportunity to specialise
operations over SafeStrings. us SafeString concatenation can be wrien in two forms, one which
can be checked to still be within its type, and one which automatically is upcast to string.
We discuss the relationship between SafeStrings and liquid types w.r.t operations over strings in
the remainder of this section. We start by discussing subtyping for strings and SafeStrings.
3.1 Subtyping
Even though strings are oen represented by objects in many languages, they do not easily ad-
mit of a principled subtype relation, especially if that subtype of string has validation conditions
(Listing 3). An inheritance relation in most OOP languages is created by extending and altering
the structure of an object. Treating the string as a structure, as in SafeStrings, allows the same
subtyping and inheritance mechanisms to be brought into play. It also simplifies the problem of
validation (Listing 4).
We may categorise subtyping broadly between nominal and structural: nominal subtyping
means that one type is the subtype of another if so declared (i.e. a named relationship is suffi-
cient), whereas structural subtyping considers two types compatible if they share corresponding
elements, regardless of names. Java is a notable example of a language with nominal subtyping,
whereas TypeScript has structural subtyping.
In languages that have subtyping, it is reasonable to ask how subtypingmightwork on SafeStrings.
Usingmonolithic SafeStrings does not provide the necessary structure to satisfactorily answer this
question. One method is to ask if one language is included within another. e inclusion problem
for regular languages is PSPACE-complete (Meyer and Stockmeyer [n. d.])), although a subset of
regular language inclusion problems can be decided in polynomial time (Hovland 2012). In partic-
ular, inclusion for RE≤k is in P , where RE≤k is the class of regular expressions where each symbol
appears at most k times. e complexity is still poor, on the order of nk , with n being the length
of the regular expression. In general, however, the problem of language inclusion for simple reg-
ular expressions is intractable (Martens et al. 2004). Moreover, these bounds hold only for regular
languages, they do not hold for the complexity of regexes.
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export class Email {
user : Parser = parseName ;
dom : Parser = parseGenericDom ;
email : Parser = parseName .then (parseAt).then (parseGenericDom )
}
Gmail extends Email {
static dom : ParserGmailDom ;
}
MoreGmail extends Gmail {
static extra : Parser = parseMore ;
email = super.email.then(extra)
}
Listing 4. Subtyping email SafeStrings in pseudocode similar to TypeScript . Subtyping can be done in the
usual fashion, by overriding and extending.
ere are various methods to simulate a subtype relation without resorting to language inclu-
sion. Listing 3 shows one such solution as suggested in the pull request for regex string literals in
TypeScript (TypeScript 2016).
let email : Email;
let gmail : Gmail;
type Gmail = Email & /ˆ[-a-z0 -9˜!$%ˆ&*_=+}{\?]+(\.[ -a-z0 -9˜!$%ˆ&*_=+}{\?]+) *@gmail
֒→ \.com$/i;
gmail = email; // correct
Listing 3. A possible, but expensive, solution to the problem of subtyping for regex-defined string literals as
found in the original pull request (Rosenwasser 2015). This method would also work for one-field SafeStrings.
In addition to obvious efficiency problems due to redundancy, it suffers from readability and maintainability
problems.
is solution is less than ideal: it does a complete check twice. First it acertains whether the
input string is of type Email and then looks again to assert membership in the second regex, which
introduces the specialisation. is is clearly of limited extensibility and maintainability. Moreover,
given the backtracking and lookahead abilities in regexes, this could be a very expensive operation.
SafeStrings address the problem of subtyping via manipulation of the structure (Figure 1). An
email SafeString might have a generic structure similar to {name, at, domain} where ‘at’ is an invari-
ant, a necessary requirement for string membership (Section 2). It is reasonable to accept a gmail
string to be a specialisation of an email. is requires that the domain contain the substring ‘gmail’
in the appropriate position. Given a set of composable parsers, a gmail subtype of an email address
is a specialisation of one, or more, of those sub-parsers. In Section 5, parser combinators are used.
ese are ideally suited for this role due to there composability. We note however that this is not
an essential requirement (Section 6).
An inheritance relation can thus be formed naturally either by changing the rules for member-
ship in structural elements, or by adding additional parts to the structure.
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// the addition ``+'' operation for \cssColour strings
blend(s1 s2 : CssColour ) : CssColour {
red = safeAdd(s1.red + s2.red) // assume that safeAdd correctly handles
֒→ overflow
// other components the same
col = new CssColour (red , green , blue)
return col
}
Listing 5. Blending two cssColour strings together in guaranteed to produce a well-formed cssColour string.
This operation is closed over its type due to the fact that a cssColour string is structurally an integer, and
addition has the required properties.
3.2 Equality
Equality, broadly speaking, carries the same dichotomy as subtyping: nominal or structural. e
details are again language dependent. Structural equality for SafeStrings asserts that foo : string
֒→ = "foo" and foo' : Foo = "foo" evaluate to true despite the fact that they have different types.
is is reasonable behaviour, as Foo is presumably a subtype of string. A purely nominal approach
however would evaluate to false, as the annotated types of the two declarations differ.
Ideally one would want to have access to both behaviours. e former reflects the intuition that
one is dealing only with strings unless otherwise required, the laer when we require the string to
have a checked structure.
TypeScript already has access to two forms of equality, inherited from JavaScript ‘==’ and ‘===’.
is gives us an easy way to model the two desired behaviours. Each SafeString therefore requires
a definition of a method, eq, in two flavours, strict and weak. Weak performs a cast of a SafeString
to its string representation, and then performs the equality test. strict checks the type instance
first before progressing to checking the contents. Section 5 gives more detail about defining these
important functions.
3.3 Typesafe Operations
One of the main advantages of liquid types is that they can confirm pre and post conditions overs
primitive types under operations. For example, an integer refined to be even only can be shown
to be even aer an operation such as multiply by two. Perhaps more importantly, it can also show
when an assertion fails. SafeStrings bring some of this discriminatory power into strings.
A SafeString, as we have seen, has an internal representation. is representation is sequence
or tree-like. Operations over a SafeString are best viewed as tree surgery over one or more nodes.
It is not usually necessary to operate on the entire tree. We have already seen this idea in Section 1
in the discussion of cssColour strings an example where it is necessary to operate over the entire
tree, but doing so results in a rational, type safe function (Listing 5).
In general however, one need only edit one or two nodes. is means that, in the event that we
do not have guaranteed closure, we need only recheck the substring that has been altered, without
having to recheck the entire string. To return to one of our running examples, email strings, we
might want to generate pseudo-random addresses via string concatenation. is procedure could
be useful in, e.g. test cases generation or fuzzing. Naturally, we want this concatenation function
“+” to behave in as safe amanner as possible, and providing as such information to the type checker
as is possible.
Depending on the precise recogniser associated with name, the “+” can be checked either stati-
cally or dynamically for closure. Given a name recogniser of /[a-zA-Z0-9]+/ for example, it can be
9
At
Dom
Right
/regex/
Le
/regex/
Name + Name
/regex/
Fig. 2. Editing individual nodes in the tree representation of a syntactically valid email address. Email ad-
dresses concatenation defined only over the name field. Depending on the regex , this can be resolved purely
statically (i.e. the concatenation of the regex is isomorphic to the original) or with a runtime check.
let email1 : Email = 'foo@bar.com'
let email2 : Email = 'bax@bar.com'
// overload + to perform safe email concatenation over names
'foo@bar.com' + 'bax@bar.com' // constrained to Email.
=> 'foobax@bar .com'
// raw string concatenation with return type string. Not a valid email address
֒→ .
'foo@bar.com' + 'bax@bar.com'
=> 'foo@bar.combax@bar .com'
Listing 6. Typesafe email concatenation and normal string concatenation in TypeScript . The user can
overload the operation by choosing to constrain the return type.
"someone@email .com".split('@')[0] // OK: returns 'someone '
"someoneemail .com".split('@')[0] // Bad: returns 'someoneemail .com' without
֒→ warning
Listing 7. Slicing in TypeScript
readily seen that concatenating two strings matching this paern are still within the paern. A
real email address name field is more complicated of course. Regular string concatenation can still
be had via cast() (Listing 6).
Anther common operation over a string is slicing, i.e. extracting a substring. e key to recog-
nising the power of slicing in SafeStrings is that we normally are looking to extract a particular
substring from a string, and not just a random slice. ese particular substrings are likely to be rep-
resented in the structure as individual elements or the composition of individual elements. Slicing
then becomes merely projection. Listing 7 shows one way to perform this in TypeScript. Given a
regex-validated string, one still needs to write email.split('@')[0]. With a SafeString however, one
simply extracts the named field, i.e. email.name(), an action that has no additional runtime cost of
extra function calls or string manipulation. Moreover, it cannot fail silently as in the manner of
Listing 7. A user desiring free slicing over a SafeString need only manipulate the raw strings as
opposed to its representation, i.e. take a slice from the cast() of the SafeString. We say about type
safe string mutation when discussing various SafeStrings in Section 5.
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private User getUser(String companyId , String userId) { ... }
public void doSomethingWithUser (String companyId , String userId) {
User user = getUser(userId , companyId )
}
Listing 8. Argument selection defects are compounded when the parameters are all typed as string.
SafeStrings reduce the instance of such defects by giving meaningful type information, rather than relying
on bi-modal information channels.
Finally, we note a use of SafeStrings that is not directly related to their form or mutability. e
problem of argument selection defects is well known. is is concerned with function parameters
of the same type being used in the incorrect order. (Rice et al. 2017) give the motivating example
found in Listing 8. A developer has mistakenly swapped the parameters in getUser. Appropriately
typing these strings as SafeStrings would prevent this error from having occurred, meaning that
the much more expensive testing process as detailed in Rice et al. is not required in this instance.
While SafeStrings do not eliminate the problem (two SafeStrings of the same type could still be
swapped), the surface area for such errors is now much smaller.
3.4 SafeStrings, Solvers, and their Applications
e question of the decidability of string theory, i.e. the problem of automatically solving string
constraints, has seen a recent renewal of interest in the research community (Abdulla et al. 2017,
2014). is is doubtless due to the recognition of the importance of analysing string manipulating
programs. A large amount of recent work has focused on the development of practical string
solvers. e list of solvers that now handle at least a part of string theory includes, but is not
limited to, Z3-str (Zheng et al. 2013), CVC4 (Liang et al. 2014) and Stranger (Yu et al. 2014). e
primary use case for these solvers is in symbolic analysis (King (King 1976), Cadar et al. (Cadar et al.
2006)). A symbolic analysis systematically explores executions in a program and collects symbolic
path constraints. A symbolic executor passes these constraints to a solver to determine which
program locations to continue exploring. For this to be a practical approach with strings, the
constraint language must precisely model strings in the language of the program under test.
Solvers are frequently used as the back end when implementing liquid types. Perhaps the
most well known implementation is that of Liquid Haskell (Vazou et al. (Vazou et al. 2014)), but
other targeed languages are ML (Xi and Pfenning (Xi and Pfenning 1999) and F♯ (Swamy et
al. (Swamy et al. 2011)). e observant will notice that these are all statically typed, functional
languages. Aempts to bring refinement types to so-called ‘scripting’ languages (such as Type-
Script) have proven difficult (Chugh et al. (Chugh et al. 2012)). is difficulty is largely due to
the interaction between higher-order functions and imperative updates. Vekris et al. (Vekris et al.
2016) develop a refinement type system for TypeScript that is primarily concernedwith addressing
these issues.
SafeStrings are complementary to this SMT-based approach. SafeStrings hold much interesting
promise for symbolic execution in that they can reduce the constraint space over a program. e
encoding of the SafeString can be passed to the SMT-solver allowing it to form constraints over
a much more detailed representation that just string. SafeStrings also reduce the complexity of
fuzzing string based programs. As the structure of a SafeString is explicit, and a program has type
checked, then, at any particular program point, it is known that a SafeString has the structure spec-
ified. A fuzzer or test generator can use this informatoin to ease the problem of finding malformed
inputs and writing unit tests.
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3.5 Closure Properties in SafeStrings.
Under SafeStrings, a even simple expression language has some surprising and enviable properties.
<expression > ::=
<const > -> number
<op > -> expression expression
As a SafeStrings grammar, any projection from this structure is a well-formed expression. Con-
sider the encoding of the string “3 * 4 + 5” as (Add (Mult (Const 3)(Const 4))(Const 5)). e available
projections from this algebra are the string itself and {(Mult (Const 3)(Const 4)), or “3 * 4”. We say
a SafeString for this expression language is closed under projection. Such a useful state of affairs
does not obtain in general. e projection of the name from a email SafeString is not itself an email
address.
Going in the other direction, some SafeStrings support injections freely, consider the simple
example of the inner-r string from Section 2. Admiedly this is a rather extreme example, but
it serves to highlight the following important point: in general it is not possible to know what
actions over a SafeString are necessarily closed over that SafeString. is means that the design of
every SafeString needs to be bespoke and will support a different subset of possible operations.
is leads naturally to the question of error handling. ere will be times when an operation
over a SafeString does not result in a well-formed SafeString. Depending on requirements, there
are two obvious ways to address this situation. One is to throw an exception and fail eagerly.
e other is to use an Either type, familiar from functional programming. Either is the commonly
accepted name for the coproduct, or disjoint union, of types in most functional languages.
4 Realisation of SafeStrings in TypeScript
To evaluate SafeStrings, we implemented them in TypeScript, because of its powerful and flexible
type system and support for both object-oriented and function programming. Moreover, stringly
typed data is extremely common in TypeScript and JavaScript code. TypeScript already offers ways
to use literals, both string and number, as types (Section 6). Combined with type guards, union
types and other features of the type system, they give ample scope for demonstrating the potential
of SafeStrings.
A SafeString requires some way to model a structure and a way to have a recogniser over that
structure. One needs only to find an image of these constructs in the language to have SafeStrings.
To model the structure in TypeScript we chose to use objects in which the fields of the object
corresponded with grammar productions. For the recognisers, we relied on parser combinators.
4.1 Parser Combinators
We use parser combinators for our evaluation due to their easy composability. TypeScript has
native support for regexes, and indeed, at the lowest level, parser combinators also make use of
regular expressions. It is not clear what the full expressive power of regexes is in the language
hierarchy, though they do have limited ability to recognise context-free languages. Monadic parser
combinators are at least as expressive as this.
Regular expressions accept strings, but SafeStrings require more than this. Parser combinators
do strictly more than accept; they can also process their input. For SafeStrings, this processing is
the creation of an AST.We present a brief overview of parser combinators in the remainder of this
subsection.
Parser combinators are familiar tools in functional programming, having been first introduced in
1975 by Burge (Burge 1975) and popularised bymany others, such as Huon andMeijer (Huon and Meijer
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spaces = some (oneOf " \t\n\r")
Listing 9. Parsing with combinator composition.
xml = do {
name <- openTag
content <- many xml
endTag name
return (Node name content)
} <|> xmlText
Listing 10. XML parsing in Haskell’s Parsec library.
1996). ey provide an elegant and declarative methods for implementing parsers. In contrast to
traditional parser generators, parser combinators are first class values which can be combined
and manipulated to define new combinators. ey elide the difference between lexers and parsers.
ey do not require a separate tool-chain, thus avoiding any integration issues. A SafeString li-
brary for TypeScript therefore can be entirely self-contained. It does not require any other tools to
work apart from the TypeScript compiler itself.
A parser combinator is a self-contained unit. For example, one can write a combinator oneOf that
succeeds if the input character is an element in its accepting list. Suppose the list is `` \t\n\r'',
then oneOf `` \t\n\r'' defines a parser that accepts exactly one whitespace. To parser multiple
whitespace, as in Listing 9, we combine, or compose, two combinators, some, which accepts one or
more instances of another parser, and oneOf. Monadic parser-combinators are able to parse context
sensitive grammars. is allows parser combinators to handle XML documents in a single pass as
in Listing 10 (Leijen and Meijer (Leijen and Meijer 2001)). is guarantees well-formedness in a
single pass over the source.
ere are some drawbacks to parser combinators. Parser generators give static termination
guarantees that most parser combinators cannot give. Work on total parser combinators, which
provably terminate is an area of active research (Danielsson (Danielsson 2010)). So far at least,
these have suffered from poor performance. Parser combinators are unable to deal directly with
le-recursion. Most parser combinator libraries provide a chain combinator (Fokker (Fokker 1995))
that captures the le-recursive design paern without obliging the user to rewrite a le recursive
grammar to be right recursive (Aho et al. (Aho et al. 1986)). ere is a risk of inefficiency with
parser combinators. However, this is not a necessary feature of parser combinator libraries and
many efficient implementations exist. TypeScript has at least one industrial strength library avail-
able4.
To model the grammar of a SafeString we chose TypeScript objects. is is primarily for familiar-
ity of programming model. Complex grammars might benefit from a more abstract representation
(i.e. the visitor paern used for an AST), with purely functional references in the form of lenses.
Finally, we also need a way to handle errors, as discussed in Section 3.5. TypeScript has good
mechanisms for exception handling.
4.2 Preprocessing for Natural Assignment
We mention a preprocessing stage in section 1. is processing stage is very simple. Its sole
function is to allow for declarations that are more string-like without needing to make changes to
the TypeScript itself. is preprocessing is not required for SafeStrings to function properly. e
4hps://github.com/jneen/parsimmon
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// a SafeString assignment
let file : FilePath = '/this/is/a/file.txt';
// the preprocess changes this tool
let file : FilePath = new FilePath ('/this /is/a/file.txt');
Listing 11. Desugaring in TypeScript .
let re = /(?<year >\d{4}) -(?<month >\d{2}) -(?<day >\d{2})/u;
let result = re.exec('2015-01-02 ');
// result.groups.year === '2015';
// result.groups.month === '01';
// result.groups.day === '02';
Listing 12. Named capture groups in JavaScript can be used in a manner similar to a SafeString for simple
structures (TypeScript 2018).
most common usage is to desugar assignments (listing 11). Preprocessing is also required to allow
for the usual TypeScript operators on strings to work as expected, if x and y are both SafeStrings,
then x == y is rewrien as x.doubleEq(y);.
e preprocess stage has one other important function. A statically declared SafeString (i.e. one
that is hard-coded) is converted into an object. Unfortunately, TypeScript does not statically check
an object’s constructor. As all of the required information is present to check this declaration, for
simplicity we pass those declarations through node is order to evaluate the constructors. It would
be easy, though unnecessary for demonstration purposes, to incorporate the parse check directly
into the compiler without having to evaluate the file.
4.3 Alternatives to Parser Combinators
Parser combinators are not a strict requirement of SafeStrings. e expressive powers of pcre2 reg-
ular expressions is sufficient to capture most of the likely use cases for type safe strings. e chief
advantages of using parser combinators are readability and compositionality. JavaScript and Type-
Script, as of 2018, have named capture groups for regular expressions(TypeScript 2018) (Listing 12).
ese can be made to correspond with simple instances of SafeStrings. Note that they do not create
a new type, but can work within an object wrapper when users wish to create an uncomplicated
SafeString.
e code in listing 12 is very close to what we want from a simple SafeString. Indeed, it au-
tomatic maps named capture groups to fields in a new SafeString object, with the associated sub-
membership tests the (sub) regular expressions. However, compose these named groups is difficult
and any change requires rechecking the entire string, unlike with a fully-fledged SafeString.
Declaring new SafeStrings of greater complexity than this is clearly a greater burden on the
programmer. One needs to identify an appropriate grammar, write recognisers for that grammar,
write methods over the structure, and write a class which encapsulates everything. Even for a
string like an email, this is a non-trivial effort. For complex structures, the code is likewise more
complex. To aid deployability, the most common SafeString types should be supplied in the form of
a library. is might include email strings, css fragments, address formats and other forms of struc-
tured data. Library writers with unique string types could write the necessary code themselves if
they require that level of type safety.
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5 SafeStrings in Action
Now that we have detailed the formation of SafeStrings and discussed the mechanics of instanti-
ating them in TypeScript, we look in more detail some concrete examples of SafeStrings, why they
are a suitable target for making safe and how they are constructed. In turn we consider filepaths,
css elements and finally email addresses.
5.1 SafeString Email Addresses
Email addresses are a common type of string in web programming. Ensuring that email strings are
well formed is a standard procedure. Extracting information from an email string is also common,
especially slicing out the name part of an email address. Email strings as string literals (Section 6) are
too inflexible: they have far too much variety of form to capture in a simple literal type. Indeed, in
the regex-validated strings pull request (TypeScript 2016), safety for email strings consumes much
of the discussion. Representing them as monolithic or regex-validated strings goes some way to
solving the problem, but fails to allow for operations and subtyping (Listing 3).
Intuitively, a subtype relation over email strings would be flat, with each provider (i.e. gmail or
hotmail) being a subtype of a generic email string. is generic email should capture the ‘essence’
(i.e. the free structure) of a email string, without being tied to specific detail.
Subtyping of email addresses is now the action of overriding the parser for one of the declared
fields. is produces a natural, intuitive, notion of type hierarchy. Turning an Email into a Gmail
means changing the domain parser to accept ‘gmail’ specifically. Unlike with regular expressions,
there is no decidability issue here either.
Operations over email strings can now be defined in such as way that they behave in a rational,
type safe way. Normal string concatenation for example will produce a new string of type string,
i.e. perform an upcast to string by default. For email addresses however, string concatenation could
be defined solely over the name field of the SafeString. Now only the parser combinator associated
with that field need be called. If this succeeds then the string is still an email string. It is not
necessary to re-parse the entire string, as would be required by a PCRE2 approach. "foo@gmail.com"
֒→ .append('bar') produces a string foobar@gmail.com : gmail. In languages which support operator
overloading, one could overload ‘+’ so that the correct definition is chosen automatically. Types
can then be checked with the typechecker.
is approach allows for a much more fine-grained handling of type safety. For example, rather
than having user : string as a projection from a gmail string, the projection can be tagged with its
origin by wrapping it an in object of its own (Listing 13).
Now the different fields of an email address can signal their origin even when detached from
the original object. ey signal the provenance of a string and reveal that it has been detached
from another structure. is can be exposed to the typechecker, or treated as a simple type alias
(Section 6). is laer serves as useful documentation to the user. With the former, it is possible
to define operations over these projections in much the same manner as for strings of type Gmail.
Such levels of type safety are not perhaps required for many simple programming tests, but the
approach allows for it when required, rather than insisting on it.
5.2 SafeString FilePaths
Filepaths are a common feature in many programs and are usually typed as string. Some languages
(e.g. Haskell) introduce a FilePath type that is, in fact, merely a type alias of string. Filepaths
have different formats on different architectures, some using \, some /, or even a mixture of the
two. Manipulating filepaths in the shell is a well known problem, relying on basename and realpath
֒→ to extract information. e shell is a unityped environment: everything is a string. While
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class GmailName {
gmailName : string;
constructor (n:string) {
this .gmailName = parse(n);
}
}
/* etc */
class Gmail {
name : GmailName
domain : Domain
}
/* etc */
Listing 13. Provenance tracking in SafeStrings. While projections from the structure can be typed as string,
they can also have their own newtype wrapper. A name extracted from an Gmail SafeString can signal its
provenance by having the type GmailName.
type WindowsPath = ˆ((((([a-z]|[A-Z]) [:\|]) ?(\\((\w|(\w[ \.]?\w))+(\\(\w|(\w[
֒→ \.]?\w))*)*)?))|
(\\?(((\w|(\w[ \.]?\w)))+(\\(\w|(\w[ \.]?\w)))+(\\(\w|(\w[ \.]?\w))*)*)?))
(\\(\w|(\w[ \.]?\w))+\.?[ˆ\.]+) ?(\:(\w|(\w[ \.]?\w))+)?)$
Listing 14. A regex-validated WindowsPath, where \w is any alphanumeric character.
shells could benefit from the versatility of SafeStrings, the problem exists equally in strongly typed
programming languages.
Amonolithic SafeString is the simplest way to gain increased type safety for filepaths. Listing 14
contains a regex-validated Windows pathfiles. It is immediately clear that this is not a useful con-
straint in a type. It is completely unmodular. Worse, it does not accept “/” as a directory separator,
though this is valid for MicroSo Windows. Closer inspection reveals that the regex contains a
great deal of repetition. is repetition can be factored out when using parser combinators, and
opens up the possibility of overriding one or more of the substrings to create specialised parsers
(Section 3.1). Using a monadic parser combinator also solves the problem of consistent directory
separators. e monadic state can be updated to accept whichever separator comes first and then
propagate that constraint over the rest of the string.
Assuming that we do not want to use a ‘simple’ monolithic SafeString, one possible representa-
tion of a filepath might be:
(FilePath (Path array <Directory >) (File (Name string) (Ext string)))
where we do not need to represent the separator nor the “.” in the filename proper as they are
invariants. is representation assumes that we wish to normalise the separator over the entire
program, i.e. cast() would be:
cast () : string = dirs .join ('n') + name.cast ();
but there is no reason why we cannot also record the direction of the file separator. is could be
used, amongst other aspects of the string, to induce a subtype relation for Filepaths based on sepa-
rator direction, making a FilePath SafeString generic over Unix andWindows style paths. UnixPath
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class UnixPath extends FilePath {
separator = '/';
}
Listing 15. Subtyping for filenames via the use of the separator.
# HomeDotFile is a SafeString where the file must be located in the home
# directory and be hidden.
HomedotFile = { dirs : [home], filename = /\.[ chars]/}
# temporarily overload rm so that it cannot delete HomeDotFile strings.
rm ˜/. bashrc # fails as ˜/. bashrc : HomeDotFile
Listing 16. Scripting in a SafeString-aware shell environment could be made much safer. A type safe rm
would make it impossible to delete files in a sensitive directory or of a particular type, but the shell itself
could remain essentially unityped with everything being considered a string.
andWindowsPath are now subtypes of FilePath, which in turn is still fully interoperable with string
(Listing 15). is is conditioned solely on the granularity of the recogniser and representation.
e internal representation of a FilePath contains a traversable structure, the array of directories.
Directories can be represented by raw strings (i.e. without associated recognisers, though further
type safety could be had by providing checks). Extracting filename, extension and path are just
named projections from the structure. Type safety can be taken further still by puing constraints
over the length and contents of array<Directory> (Listing 16). e location of a file can be encoded
in the type information and checked dynamically.
Suppose a shell with support for SafeStrings with method overloading. is is not unreasonable,
as SafeStrings can function as simple strings when required. In it, the shell would allow you to
define a SafeString HomePath. A string of type HomePath points to a file in the home directory. overload
mv temporarily to mv so that it only functions from HomePath to one of its descendants. One can
then call mv safe in the knowledge that in incorrect assignment is now impossible.
5.3 SafeStrings in CSS and Web-forms
Web-based programming is especially rich in strings. Cascading Style sheets (css) is an almost
ubiquitous style sheet language that is fundamentally stringly-typed. is makes it very easy to
incorrectly assign data with lile that either a type checker or static analyser can do to prevent
it. Here we show how SafeStrings solve this problem using four examples: css colours, phone
numbers, units, and cross-site scripting.
CSS Colours We have already see in Section 1 some of the problems caused by representing
colours as strings. Analysing a cssColour string reveals an underlying structure despite the su-
perficial differences in presentation. Both ``#000'' and ``#000000'' encode the same information,
but unimportant differences restrict their interoperability. Even simple equality fails: ``#000''
does not equal ``#000000'' even though they represent the same colour. Abstracting a cssColour
string, however, gives the structure (Colour (Red N) (Green N) (Blue N)) which elides these super-
ficial differences. Regular expressions can instantiate this structure for a particular string, but it is
accomplished even more easily with a parser :
cssColour = parseHash .then(parseRed.then(parseGreen .then (parseBlue )))
If the parser accepts, then the raw string is a cssColour and can be represented as a record
(Listing 17). Equality is now optionally over the structure of the cssColour. e original strings
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class CssColour {
red : number
green : number
blue : number
}
Listing 17. A concrete realisation of ASTPL for a cssColour
cast () : string = '#' + red.toString (16) + green.toString (16) + blue .toString
֒→ (16)
Listing 18. CSS colour string cast.
ˆ(?:(?:\+?1\ s*(?:[. -]\ s*)?) ?(?:\
(\s*([2 -9]1[02 -9]|[2 -9][02-8]1|[2 -9][02 -8][02 -9])\s*\)|
([2 -9]1[02 -9]|[2 -9][02-8]1|[2 -9][02 -8][02 -9]))\s*
(?:[. -]\ s*)?) ?([2 -9]1[02 -9]|[2 -9][02 -9]1|[2 -9][02 -9]{2})
\s*(?:[. -]\ s*) ?([0 -9]{4})(?:\ s*(?:#|x\.?| ext \.?| extension )\s*(\d+))?$
Listing 19. Regex for US phone numbers taken from from a stackoverflow answer.
can, of course, still be compared as strings, using SafeStrings’ cast() operation. For a cssColour the
definition is shown in Listing 18. e ’#’ symbol is invariant, so it does not need to be stored.
is CssColour representation, and the fact that it contains only valid hexadecimal colour strings,
is much easier to manipulate than raw strings. Changing elements in the structure leaves the
structure itself, notably its type, unaltered. For example, say we wanted to blend two colours
together. is is not easily done when dealing with raw strings:
'#123 ' + '#332211' // naive: '#123#332211', an obviously invalid cssColour
Phone Numbers Phone numbers entered on websites make excellent SafeStrings. Unfortunately,
there is no universal model for phone number construction to act as a supertype from which other
formats can be derived ((Wikipedia contributors 2019)). Obtaining a regex to correctly match US
phone numbers is difficult. Consider Listing 19, which shows a regex taken from a stackoverflow
answer (fatcat1111 2017). One can readily see that this is inappropriate for a type constraint,
and highly inflexible. Underlying this surface complexity, there is the NANP: North American
Numbering Plan (NANPA 2019). is gives a formaing convention of NPA-NXX-XXXX where NPA is a
three digit area code and the remaining seven digits are the subscriber number. is maps neatly
into the structure in (NPA N (Central N) (Ident N)) where N is a digit from 2–9. Whitespace, dots,
dashes, or some combination may separate the groups. Parser combinators easily parse a number
string into this structure, even when a mix of separators is used. Appropriately defining cast()
cleanly normalises the format, without resorting to functions such as replaceAll().
Parsers expect structured data: the code in listing 20 is reasonably generous in what it accepts. It
recognises as a phone number 555-211 1234' with mixed separators, and 5552111234 as valid phone
numbers. It does not accept other groupings such as 55 52111 234. e well-known Robustness
Principle or Postel’s Law (Postel 1980) states “Be liberal in what you accept, and conservative in
what you send” but it is also well-known that this maxim has harmful consequences (ompson
2018). It is a difficult design decision to know how flexible to be when accepting input: in this case,
we require that the input have at least the structural grouping of a phone number.
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import * as P from 'parsimmon '
let separator =
P.oneOf(" \./-").fallback ('');
let areacode = P.regexp (/[2 -9][0 -9]{2}/).map(Number).desc('a valid area code ');
let nxx = P.regexp (/[2 -9][0 -9]{2}/).map(Number).desc('a valid office code ');
let xxxx = P.regexp (/[0 -9]{4}/).map(Number).desc ('a valid identifier ');
let phoneParser =
P.seqMap(
areacode ,
separator ,
nxx ,
separator ,
xxxx ,
function (a, s1 , n, s2 , x) { return [a, n, x] }
);
class USPhone {
area : number;
office : number;
uniq : number;
constructor (phone : string) {
let pn : number[] = phoneParser .tryParse(phone);
this.area = pn [0];
this.office = pn[1];
this.uniq = pn [2];
}
cast () : string {
return this.area.toString () + "-" + this .office.toString () + "-" + this.
֒→ uniq .toString ();
}
}
Listing 20. A part of the realisation of a US phone number SafeString in TypeScript , using the ’parsimmon’
parser combinator library. This code fails with a parse error if the string is not accepted.
<!-- we assume that margin , width , padding etc have type (PX | AUTO) in this
֒→ example --!>
object { height : 250px; width : 200px; margin: 10pc; margin -bottom: 10px;
padding: 5px;}
Listing 21. An easy typing error leads to a difficult to find mistake in css. Linting toolsmay find the problem,
but as a SafeString this unit error would be caught automatically.
Units Units in css, such as pixels, points and picas, are all stringly typed. is makes it extremely
easy to assign the wrong unit to the wrong variable. It also makes it very difficult to a static
analysis to identify these errors. Yet, the latent structure of these strings is scarcely latent at all.
Fortunately, SafeStrings easily solve the latent structure problem for these strings.
A string “1cm” has the simple representation (CM 1). It is trivial to catch the incorrect assignment
let font-size : Point = '1cm'. It may seem that modelling these strings as SafeStrings is excessive.
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// overloading + for a pixel string
add(operand : Pixel | Picas | Points) {
if (operand isinstanceof Pixel) { return cm self.value + operand.value; }
else if (operand isinstanceof Picas) { return cm self .value + operand.toCm ();
֒→ }
// ... etc
}
Listing 22. The complexity of adding incompatible units can be abstracted away from the front-end user.
<!-- unsafe html --!>
<h1> User <span onMouseOver =''popupText ('{{ bio}}') ''>{{ userName }}</span ></h1>
<!-- the same code , with \safes for added safety --!>
<h1> User <span onMouseOver =''popupText ('{{ bio : Sanitised }}') ''>{{ userName :
֒→ UserName }}</span ></h1>
Listing 23. A simple example of XSS scripting in HTML as found in (Chen et al. 2017). Typing user input with
SafeStrings significantly reduces the surface area for XSS aacks. Moreover, the structure of the user input
is now known and can be used elsewhere in the code without having to recheck it. The SafeString Sanitised
acts as a certificate for the contents of the input string; UserName does the same.
// a typical SQL query with a vulnerability
statement = `` SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ' '' + userName `` ';''
// if userName = ' OR '1'='1' -- (bad: a SQL injection )
// an appropriate UserName sanitises the string , but also passes the
// information to the type checker
statement = `` SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ' '' + userName : UserName `` ';
֒→ ''
Listing 24. SafeStrings for SQL queries can substantially reduce the surface for an injection aack.
is is not the case. Listing 21 has a simple mistake, c was typed instead of x in the unit for margin;
spoing this error in a dense page of css is difficult and time-consuming. A linter may not detect
this as an error. A declaration that margin takes the union type (PX | AUTO) catches the error without
programmer effort.
Stripping the unit information and normalising the numerical representation alsomakes it much
easier to define conversion functions that do not expose their complexity to the front-end user. is
can be achieved by, for example, operator overloading. If operator overloading is not desired (Type-
Script for example does not encourage it), then TypeScript’s union types can be used to overload a
function to choose the correct transformation (listing 22).
Cross-site Scripting Poor control of strings can result in bugs that are merely irritating, i.e.
layout and colour problems, or bugs that are dangerous. XSS (cross-site scripting) falls into the
laer category. e replaceAll function is oen used to sanitise user input in an aempt to mitigate
the danger of XSS aacks (Chen et al. 2017). ey take as a running example the code fragment in
Listing 23. A SafeString for sanitised data could be a monolithic SafeString, habitation of the type
being a proof that the input string does not contain a code injection. Now the string is Sanitised
SafeString. Such a string can be used elsewhere without being reexamined, amortising the initial
cost of checking. Such a check would be performed anyway in conscientious code, but knowledge
of the sanitisation would not be passed to the type checker, leaving the programmer to check the
string again and again.
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record SString : Set where
constructor mkString
field
s : String -- the raw string
re : RegEx -- the recogniser
p : SubString re (unpackString s) // this is a proof of membership
makeSafe : String → RegEx → Maybe SString
makeSafe s re with s ∈? re
makeSafe s re | yes pr = just $ record {s = s; re = re; p = pr }
makeSafe s re | no x = nothing
helloString : SString
helloString = fromJust $ makeSafe "hello" hello
Listing 25. What price safety? Dependent types allow a SafeString to carry with it its own proof of
correctness. The programming burden for this style is non-trivial.
SQL injection aacks can also be reduced via SafeStrings. Listing 24 contains a simple SQL
injection. Defining a UserName SafeString can effectively sanitise the user input. Escaping via e.g.
replaceAll() is error prone, but abstracting dangerous elements of the input string into an AST and
then using a cast() operation that cannot produce malformed input is a much safer approach.
6 Related Work
As there is lile theoretical that corresponds directly to our approach with SafeStrings, we first
focus on work that we believe is compatible, such as the use of constraint solvers, symbolic execu-
tion, the use of dependent and liquid types, and regex-validated string types. We go on to compare
SafeStrings with various, mostly informal, approaches to the string latent structure problem such
as type aliasing, the use of new types, object wrappers, and string literal types.
6.1 Liquid Types and Dependent Types
Type systems of differing levels of granularity and expressiveness abound both in the literal and in
practice. SafeStrings solution to the latent structure problem has a strong overlap with dependent
and liquid types. SafeStrings are programmable in a dependently typed language and offer very
strong guarantees: under the Curry-Howard correspondence (Sørensen and Urzyczyn 2006), types
are propositions and functions proofs. Making proofs out of functions is powerful, but requires
much from a programmer intent on delivering a product. e code in Listing 25 allows the user
to pass around not merely the structure itself, but a computer verified proof that the string is in
the given language. Most languages do not offer this possibility, but not having a proof to consult
does not mean that safety is compromised.
e goal of both dependent types and liquid types is to make the type level abstraction of pro-
gram behaviour more expressive and less coarse. Strings have seen lile research in this area,
perhaps due to the problems of decidability in string theory (Ganesh et al. 2011).
6.2 Regular Expression Validation
Regex-validated string types of (TypeScript 2016) allow for a high degree of type safety w.r.t to
strings. SafeStrings are strictly more expressive in that they are not tied to one form of membership
test (i.e. PCRE2). Arbitrary logic can be included in the recogniser for a SafeString. SafeStrings
also support subtyping, and operations over SafeStrings. ese operations can be overloaded to
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type Name = string;
foo : Name = 'hello';
bar : string = 'hello';
foo == bar -> True // we probably want this to be false
Listing 26. Type aliasing in TypeScript
interface Name { name : string }
let foo : Name = { name 'hello' }
foo == 'hello' // results in a 'no overlap ' error , rather than just false
Listing 27. TypeScript Inferfaces can be used to create new types by wrapping other types.
support ad hoc polymorphism. e maintenance burden of SafeStrings is not much more that
regex-validated types. For simple declarations, the newly introduced named capture groups can
stand in the stead of parser combinators (Section 4.3). Indeed, there is no theoretical necessity for
parser combinators in the TypeScript implementation except for the noted provisos in Section 4.3
of subtyping and readability.
6.3 Industrial Approaches
ere are a number of informal approaches to increased string type safety which make for reason-
ably usable design paerns.
e simplest is type aliasing (Team 2019). is is supported in many languages, but its primary
use case is oen for documentation purposes rather than type safety. In TypeScript, for example,
one writes type Name = string. From the perspective of enforcing invariants however, the utility
of aliasing is limited because it cannot enforce type (in-)equality (Listing 26). It cannot prevent
static type errors of the kind gmail : Gmail = "not a gmail address", where Gmail is some previously
declared type alias for string.
If a language has newtypes, greater type safety can be achieved. ese are a wrapper around an
already existing type. A newtype is different from am alias in that it is exposed to the type checker
and can be used to enforce inequality. Object-orientated languages support these by wrapping
a primitive type in an object or using an interface (Team 2019). Listing 27 shows the syntax in
TypeScript. is object wrapper paern can be validated with a recogniser (Listing 30). A simple
instance of this paern is explored in (Fowler 1999). e constructor is augmented with a regex
check for string membership. e constructor fails with an error if the string is not in the language
expressed by the regex. is paern is captured by monolithic SafeStrings.
Since version 1.8, TypeScript has had string and number literal types (Team 2019). e original
pull request for string literals (Rosenwasser 2015) summarises them as: “A string literal type is a
type whose expected value is a string with textual contents equal to that of the string literal type.”
A string literal type can only be assigned the exact value specified in that type Listing 28. String
literal types can be used with other features of the type system, most notably union types, to create
(finite) enumerable sets of strings. is allows them to act as type guards in paern-matching in
a similar way to type constructors in paern-matching within the ML family (Listing 29). Regex-
extended string literals relax the need for exact matching, making string literal types even more
expressive.
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const good : "click" = "click";; // this is OK
const bad : "click" = "notAClick " // this assignment fails
Listing 28. A simple example of string literals in TypeScript to increase type safety for functions which take
strings as parameters.
type Direction = "North" | "South" | "East" | "West "
function move(direction : Direction ) {
if (direction == "North") {
// move north
} .... // enumerate the options
}
move ("SouthWest ") // error: not one of our directions
Listing 29. A suggested use for string literals, as proposed in the original pull request (Rosenwasser 2015).
This gives considerable expressive power and safety to functions that take strings. SafeStrings make this
even more expressive.
class Name {
name:string;
/* optional regex check for membership */
constructor (name :string) {
this .name = name
}
}
Listing 30. An object wrapper with a membership check. This paern corresponds tomonolithic SafeStrings.
e approach in Listing 30 is a design paern which can be implemented in any language with
records and access to regular expressions (Fowler 1999). is gives the paern a distinct advan-
tage over regex-validated strings and string literals. It does not require any changes to the target
language to introduce these features. It uses only what the language already has. is is useful
from the point of view of safety, but is problematic in some respects. Most obviously, it lacks the
flexibility of SafeStrings; making operations more difficult to define, and limiting subtyping to the
nominal system.
7 Conclusion
We have presented SafeStrings, a language-agnostic approach to type safety for strings. SafeStrings
introduce many of the benefits associated with liquid types into an area previously lile explored.
SafeStrings require no special languagemechanisms, requiring only an ability to encode structures
and recognisers. One need only find the image of these concepts within the language to encode a
SafeString. SafeStrings are applicable either statically or dynamically. Indeed, SafeStrings squeeze
more invariants out of simple type systems by treating strings as algebraic structures. e com-
plexity of advanced language features, such as dependent types and GADTs, are thus not required.
A simple type system can go further by puing the burden of representation on the producer of
library code, rather than the consumer.
We have also presented an instantiation of SafeStrings in TypeScript, showing the relative ease
with which they can be encoded and used. Such strings represent a fragment of what can be
achieved with dependent types in a non-dependently typed system. We do this by translating a
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structure over which we have no particular control (i.e. string) into a form that exposes rich latent
structure to the type checker. All artefacts are available at anonymised.repo.to.do.
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